134 Kasserine, After the Battle, AFTER THE BATTLE
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
//-->KASSERINENumber 1343 49770306154080£3.95NUMBER 134© CopyrightAfter the Battle2006Editor-in-Chief: Winston G. RamseyManaging Editor: Gordon RamseyEditor: Karel MargryPublished byBattle of Britain International Ltd.,The Mews, Hobbs Cross House,Hobbs Cross, Old Harlow,Essex CM17 0NN, EnglandTelephone: 01279 41 8833Fax: 01279 41 9386E-mail: hq@afterthebattle.comWebsite: www.afterthebattle.comPrinted in Great Britain byWarners Group Publications PLC.,Bourne, Lincolnshire PE10 9PH.After the Battleis published on the 15thof February, May, August and November.LONDON STOCKIST for theAfter the Battlerange:Motorbooks, 33 St Martin’s Court, St Martin’s Lane,London WC2N 4ANTelephone: 020 7836 5376. Fax: 020 7497 2539United Kingdom Newsagent Distribution:Warners Group Publications PLC.,Bourne, Lincolnshire PE10 9PHUnited States Distribution and Subscriptions:RZM Imports Inc, 151 Harvard Avenue,Stamford, CT 06902Telephone: 1-203-653-2272Fax: 1-203-965-0047E-mail: info@rzm.com Website: www.rzm.comCanadian Distribution and Subscriptions:Vanwell Publishing Ltd., PO Box 2131,1 Northrup Crescent,St. Catharines, Ontario L2R 7S2.Telephone: (905) 937 3100 Fax: (905) 937 1760Toll Free: 1-800-661-6136E-mail: sales@vanwell.comAustralian Subscriptions and Back Issues:Renniks Publications Pty LimitedUnit 3, 37-39 Green Street, Banksmeadow NSW 2019Telephone: 61 2 9695 7055. Fax: 61 2 9695 7355E-mail: info@renniks.com. Web site: www.renniks.comNew Zealand Distribution:Dal McGuirk’s “MILITARY ARCHIVE”, P.O. Box 24486,Royal Oak, Auckland 1030 New Zealand.Telephone: 021 627 870 Fax: 9-6252817E-mail: milrchiv@mist.co.nzItalian Distribution:Tuttostoria, PO Box 395, 1-43100 Parma.Telephone: ++390521 29 27 33, Fax: ++390521 29 03 87E-mail: tuttostoria@libero.itDutch Language Edition:SI Publicaties/Quo Vadis, Postbus 282, 6800 AG Arnhem.Telephone: 026-4462834E-mail: si@sipublicaties.nlIn mid-February 1943, the Germans launched a two-pronged attack against theUS II Corps in western Tunisia. In the north, the 5. Panzerarmee under GeneraloberstHans-Jürgen von Arnim burst through the Faïd Pass with two armoured divisions tak-ing Sidi Bouzid and starting a drive for Sbeïtla (Operation ‘Frühlingswind’). In thesouth, Kampfgruppe DAK (Deutsches Afrikakorps) under Feldmarschall Erwin Rommelfollowed this up by taking Gafsa (Operation ‘Morgenluft’). Taking the Americans bysurprise, and inflicting heavy losses on them, the Germans achieved a complete break-through and by February 18 their two forces had linked up in front of the KasserinePass. Sensing a chance to achieve an even bigger victory, Rommel attacked throughthe pass on the 19th, sending his spearheads both north towards El Kef and north-west towards Tébessa. Fierce fighting raged in the pass and on the two roads leadingout of it for several days, but the Allies, rallying all available reserves, narrowly heldon. By February 22 the German offensive had run its course. Rommel called off theattack, and ordered his forces to retire to their starting positions.EL KEFMAKTARKAIROUANTÉBESSACONTENTSKASSERINEUNLUCKY BAPTISM OF FIREMWO FOR THEPOLISH PARA BRIGADE24154GAFSAFront Cover:The German offensive in Tunisia thatbecame known as the Battle for the Kasserine Passlasted from February 15 to 22, 1943. Taking the greenAmerican troops completely by surprise, it inflictedheavy losses on the Allies in men and material until iteventually ran out of steam west of the KasserinePass. On February 26, with the tide of war reversed,Signal Corps photographer McGray pictured troops ofthe 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment, movingback down to the embattled pass. (USNA)Inset:Thesame spot today along the P13 road from Tébessa.(Jean Paul Pallud).Centre Pages:Map of the German offensive in westernTunisia, showing the German advance from the FaïdPass, through Sidi Bouzid and Sbeïtla to the KasserinePass and the subsequent fighting on the Thala andTébessa roads, February 14-22, 1943. The map isreproduced fromThe Mediterranean and the MiddleEast, Volume IV: The Destruction of the Axis Forces inAfrica(HMSO, London, 1966), a volume of the BritishOfficial History of the war.Back Cover:The ceremony for the presentation of theMilitaire Willems-Orde, the highest Dutch award for brav-ery, to the 1st Independent Polish Parachute Brigade forits role in the Battle of Arnhem took place at the Binnen-hof, the courtyard of the Dutch Parliament, in The Hagueon May 31, 2006. (RP)Acknowledgements:For help with the story on theMWO for the Polish Para Brigade, the Editor would liketo thank Kolonel (ret) Alex Ligteringen Verstegen, Sec-retary and Member of the Chapter of the MilitaireWillems-Orde, and Frans Ammerlaan of the Market-Garden Foundation.Photo Credits:ECPAD — Médiathèque de la Défense,Paris; IWM — Imperial War Museum, London; RP —Royal Portraits Netherlands (Bernard Rübsamen); USNA— US National Archives.GABÈSThe topography of Tunisia is marked by a mountain chain that forms a vast inverted Y.The solid stem extends northwards to Cap Bon, and the fork is just south of El Fahs.One prong, the Eastern Dorsale, projects southward for over 200 kilometres to thetown of Maknassy while a still longer extension to the south-west, the Western Dor-sale, reaches beyond Fériana. The Eastern Dorsale can be crossed at only five gaps andpasses — at Pichon, Fondouk, Faïd, Aïn Rebaou and Maknassy — or around the south-ern end along the road leading north-west from Gabès. Similarly, there are only fourmountain passes crossing the Western Dorsale — at Maktar, Sbiba, Kasserine andFériana. All of these passes would come to play vital roles in the February 1943 battle.The Mediterranean theatre of operationsopened in 1940 when Italy tried to expand itsAfrican colonies. The venture quickly turnedinto disaster with a sound British rebuff, andthe Italian defeat prompted Hitler to dis-patch a small force to Africa. Starting in Feb-ruary 1941, the victories of the DeutschesAfrikakorps against the British Eighth Armyled to a steady trickle of reinforcements ofthe German contingent, but never enoughfor a decisive edge. To Hitler, North Africaremained a peripheral theatre of operations.Contrarily, from the beginning it was ofmajor importance in the British imperialgrand strategy as the Mediterranean formedthe vital link to the Middle East and India viathe Suez Canal. The desert campaignremained at a stalemate in Libya throughmost of 1941 and early 1942 with the frontshifting east and west whenever either sideenjoyed temporary advantages in forces andsupplies. Following Germany’s invasion ofthe Soviet Union in June 1941, North Africabecame even more secondary to the Germanhigh command and the balance of forcesthere progressively swung in Britain’s favour.2Kasserine came as a terrible blow to the Americans, a setbackthat struck the American home front with shocked disbelief. Intheir first battle against the German Wehrmacht the US Armyhad suffered a humiliating rout. Led by an incompetent corpscommander, who had spread his forces too thin and commit-ted his reserves piecemeal, the green and inexperienced GI sol-diers proved no match for the veteran Wehrmacht troops.Badly positioned units were left in place too long, causingthem to be cut off and forced to surrender. On two consecutivedays ill-conceived counter-attacks led to the completeEarly in 1942 American PresidentFranklin D. Roosevelt promised the Rus-sians that the US Army would begin to fightthe German Army somewhere before theend of the year. British Prime Minister Win-ston Churchill insisted that the invasion ofnorth-west Africa was the only stroke thatcould be delivered that autumn. In spite ofopposition from his own Chiefs-of-Staff,Roosevelt concurred and the decision wastaken in July 1942 to invade that corner ofNorth Africa.After more discussions, it was agreed thatOperation ‘Torch’, as it became called,would include simultaneous landings atthree locations in French North Africa:Casablanca, Oran and Algiers. The directivedestruction of the tank unit involved. On several occasions,whole units broke and retreated to the rear in chaos, abandon-ing their weapons and vehicles. In all, during the week-longfight, the Americans lost 183 tanks, 208 guns, 194 half-tracks,560 trucks, 42 aircraft and countless small arms and items ofequipment. The human cost was equally high: 192 men killed,2,624 wounded and 2,459 taken prisoner.Left:A large group ofcaptured GIs is allowed a rest by their German guards. (ECPAD)Right:The same spot on the arid plain between Sbeïtla andFaïd, found by Jean Paul Pallud in March 2006.given in August to General Dwight D.Eisenhower, the American Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Force,described the ultimate objective of ‘Torch’as the ‘complete annihilation of Axis forcesBy Jean Paul Palludnow opposing the British forces in the West-ern Desert’.The run-up to the February battles had begun three monthsearlier. In reaction to the Allied ‘Torch’ landings in north-westAfrica on November 9, 1942, the Axis had begun a massivebuild-up of troops and supplies in Tunisia. Between November1942 and January 1943, a total of nearly 112,000 troops —81,222 Germans and 30,735 Italians — and over 100,000 tons ofsupplies were flown and shipped to Tunisia. At the peak of theair operation, the daily flight consisted of an average of 200Junkers Ju 52 and 15 of the huge six-engined MesserschmittMe 323 transport aircraft. Here a large formation of Ju 52sskims low over the Mediterranean on its way to Tunisia.(ECPAD)3A new body, the LXXXX. Armeekorps,was created in Tunis in mid-November1942 to command the swiftly increasingGerman forces in Tunisia. The headquar-ters was elevated to that of 5. Pan-zerarmee on December 8 and a new com-mander, Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen vonArnim, then took over. A Silesian aristo-crat, son of a general, respected andquiet-spoken, he had previously com-manded the XXXIX. Panzerkorps on theEastern Front. This picture of him wastaken in May 1943, after the capitulationof the last Axis forces in Tunisia. (IWM)By late October 1942, the Eighth Armyhad secured the initiative in Libya at the sec-ond battle of El Alamein and German andItalian forces were in headlong retreatthrough Libya. After being away sick for amonth, Feldmarschall Erwin Rommel wassent back to Africa urgently to resume com-mand of the Deutsch-Italienische Panzer-armee (on October 10, Panzerarmee Afrika,the former Afrikakorps, had been given thisnew name).‘Torch’ was launched on November 8, allthree landings taking place by and largewithout serious opposition from Frenchforces. All fighting ceased on November 11as a result of orders by Admiral Jean-François Darlan, the C-in-C of the ArmedForces of Vichy France, who was then inAlgiers. By that time the Allied beach-headwas secure. Now came the task of drivingeastwards on to Tunisia. The Eastern TaskForce under British Lieutenant-GeneralKenneth Anderson (to be officially renamedBritish First Army on January 1, 1943) beganto advance from Algeria in an effort to gainthe Bizerte–Tunis area before the Germanscould do so.The Axis command lost no time reactingto the Allied landings and as early as theevening of November 8, preparations were infull swing to ship ground troops to Tunisia,primarily Italians, supported by such Ger-man specialised units as were immediatelyavailable in Italy. Sea and air transport wastemporarily diverted from supplying Rom-mel’s army in order to rush new units toTunisia.Also, at midnight on November 10/11,Axis forces began to invade the previouslyunoccupied southern part of France. TenGerman divisions, two of which werearmoured, swept across southern France,and six Italian divisions marched into easternFrance. The French fleet remained at thebase in Toulon, the object of covetous atten-tion from both Allied and Axis commands(seeAfter the BattleNo. 76).4On February 9, Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, the Oberbefehlshaber Süd(German Commander-in-Chief South), came to Tunisia to confer with von Arnim,Rommel, and Generale Giovanni Messe, the designated commander of the 1a Armatathat was soon to take over the defence of the Mareth Line, to discuss future opera-tions. Since the beginning of February, Rommel had been advocating that an attackwestwards should be launched to counter an Allied eastward strike to the coast. Itwas during the February 9 conference, which took place at the Luftwaffe commandpost at Ghannouch (Rhennouch) near Gabès, that the plans for a combined attack byvon Arnim’s 5. Panzerarmee and Rommel’s Kampfgruppe DAK, a composite Germanand Italian force of division strength, were formulated, Kesselring ruling that Arnim’sattack would come first, followed by Rommel’s a day or two later. This picture ofKesselring and Rommel was taken later in February, at the height of the Kasserinebattle, when Kesselring had come to Kasserine to see Rommel. On the right is OberstFritz Bayerlein, Rommel’s Chief-of-Staff. (ECPAD)By the end of November there were over15,000 German and 9,000 Italian troops inthe Bizerte and Tunis areas. On December 8,a new commander, Generaloberst Hans-Jür-gen von Arnim, arrived in Tunisia and tookcommand of these forces under a new head-quarters designated 5. Panzerarmee.The Germans had won the race and bymid-December a stalemate had developedalong the Tunisian frontier, with the Alliesstill too weak to overcome the Axis defences,and the German-Italian forces conducting anaggressive defence, though they were notstrong enough and too poorly supplied todrive the enemy back into Algeria.Anderson’s First Army held the line withthree corps of three different nationalities.The British V Corps (Lieutenant-GeneralCharles Allfrey) occupied the northern sec-tor, from the Mediterranean shore to southof Bou Arada; the French XIXème Corpsd’Armée (Général Louis Koeltz) the middlesector from Bou Arada as far south as Hajebel Aïoun; and the US II Corps (Major Gen-eral Lloyd R. Fredendall) kept the line fromthere through Sidi Bouzid to Gafsa. The twosouthern corps were deployed along theEastern Dorsale, the mountain chain thatprojects southward across central Tunisia.In December, Hitler agreed that the con-duct of operations in Tunisia, as in Libya,would be the responsibility of the ItalianComando Supremo, which was based inRome. To reach close co-operation betweenthe two partners, a new German operationsstaff was attached to the command.To mollify his Italian partners, Hitler hadalso agreed to their demand that as soon asthe Deutsch-Italienische Panzerarmeeretired into Tunisia, Rommel would bereplaced by an Italian commander. On Janu-ary 23, 1943, Mussolini designated Generaled’Armata Giovanni Messe (who had led theItalian Expeditionary Corps in the East) toassume command of this new 1a Armata.Rommel, by then mentally and physicallyexhausted and having ‘little desire to go onany longer playing the scapegoat for a packof incompetents’ (as he wrote in his mem-oirs), initially asked Comando Supremo tosend Messe to Tunisia at once. However hesoon changed his mind, deciding instead‘only to give up command of the army onorders, regardless of the state of my health’.The day before Messe was nominated, it wasdecided to defer Rommel’s departure untilhis army was firmly established in theMareth Line. The change-over was post-poned a second time on February 18 toenable Rommel to command the offensiveactions then in course.The strength of the Axis forces under vonArnim’s 5. Panzerarmee in Tunisia rose dur-ing January, reaching a total of about100,000, of which 74,000 were Germans, and26,000 Italians. Meanwhile, disregardinginstructions for a last-ditch defence of Libya,Rommel managed to extricate most of hismuch-depleted army into Tunisia. By earlyFebruary his Deutsch-Italienische Panzer-armee — numbering about 30,000 Germanand 48,000 Italian troops — was back in theMareth Line, an old French fortified areaaround Mareth, south-east of Gabès. Theboundary between Rommel’s and vonArnim’s armies was an east-west line justnorth of Gabès.Fearing an Allied eastward attack towardsSfax or Gabès, which would divide the twoarmies, Comando Supremo asked theDeutsch-Italienische Panzerarmee to moveforces to the Gabès area to counter the men-ace. Rommel agreed to send over the 21.Panzer-Division, which started moving weston the morning of January 13.On January 28 Comando Supremoordered the 5. Panzerarmee to advance itsleft wing to areas more favourable fordefence against the expected Allied attack.To this end, the army was to go over to theoffensive at three points: the Rebaa OuladYahia valley; the pass through the EasternDorsale at Faïd; and the road centre andoasis at Gafsa.Above:In overall command of Allied operations in North WestAfrica was Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Com-mander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force. His Allied ForceHeadquarters (AFHQ) was at Algiers, a long way from thebattlefront in Tunisia, making it difficult to keep a tight rein ondevelopments. Here, Eisenhower enjoys a C ration during aninspection tour of the Tunisian front in March 1943. (USNA)Left:On January 1, 1943, the Eastern Task Force of Operation‘Torch’ was renamed British First Army, Lieutenant-GeneralKenneth Anderson retaining command. On the 21st Eisen-hower gave First Army responsibility for co-ordinating theoperations of all British, French and American forces on theTunisian front. Here Anderson visits the command post ofGénéral Louis Koeltz, the commander of the French XIXèmeCorps d’Armée, near Maktar. (ECPAD)Above:Major GeneralLloyd R. Fredendall commanded the US II Corps under Ander-son. Highly rated in the US Army for his training skill, heproved to have serious flaws as a combat commander. A loudand brassy know-all, he was inclined to be critical of superiorsand subordinates alike. He rarely left his command post forpersonal visits and reconnaissance, yet was impatient withrecommendations of subordinates more familiar with condi-tions at the front. His command style was marred by a ten-dency to phrase his orders in tough-guy slang, often leaving hissubordinates in doubt about his precise intentions. He wasAnglophobe in general, anti-Anderson in particular, and had lit-tle patience for the French. (USNA)In early January 1943, the Allies wereindeed preparing plans for a drive by the USII Corps (part of Anderson’s First Army)eastwards across Tunisia to the Sfax area.Code-named Operation ‘Satin’, its objectivewas to cut German supply lines in the rear ofRommel’s army in Libya. However, it soonbecame apparent that the Eighth Armywould be unable to support this offensivebecause the harbour of Tripoli, throughwhich it was to be supplied, had been demol-ished by the Germans and was still beingrestored to service. There thus existed therisk that Rommel would have his hands freeto intervene against the II Corps at Sfax, andso on January 15 Eisenhower decided to can-cel ‘Satin’ for the time being.On January 20, he issued a directive toAnderson’s First Army that operations onthe southern flank must be defensive andthat the US 1st Armored Division, whichtogether with French forces formed the mainstrength of II Corps, be held ‘well concen-trated’ in mobile reserve. The decision wasthen taken to withdraw the poorly equippedFrench forces for re-arming, which requireda new directive issued on the 26th to GeneralAnderson. Again, Eisenhower insisted thathe ‘deemed it essential that your mobilestriking forces in the south be held well con-centrated so as to strike en masse when theneed arises’.US II CORPS RAID AGAINST SENEDFollowing Eisenhower’s directive of Janu-ary 20 to act defensively, but failing to notehis insistence to have the bulk of the 1stArmored Division concentrated, GeneralFredendall devised an operation to takeMaknassy, 80 kilometres east of Gafsa on theroad to Sfax, and the pass through the East-ern Dorsale just east of it.The 1st Armored Division, commanded byMajor General Orlando Ward, was howeveralready largely committed to other opera-tions. Combat Command A (Brigadier Gen-eral Raymond E. McQuillin) was assemblingnear Sbeïtla to join the French in an opera-tion planned for the 23rd to regain the Fon-douk gap, and Combat Command B(Brigadier General Paul M. Robinett) hadorders to move to the Ousseltia valley in sup-port of another operation by the XIXèmeCorps d’Armée. To carry out the Maknassyattack, General Ward therefore organised aCombat Command C under Colonel RobertI. Stack, commander of the 6th ArmoredInfantry Regiment, and consisting of onebattalion of the 6th Armored Infantry, onecompany of the 81st Reconnaissance Battal-ion, one company of the 13th Armored Regi-ment, plus engineers, artillery and signalscontingents.Before launching the attack on Maknassy,Fredendall decided to first undertake a hit-and-run raid on Sened, a railway station vil-lage halfway to Maknassy along the sameroad. Though both General Ward andGénéral Joseph Welvert, the commander ofthe French Division de Constantine (whichheld the II Corps line south of the 1stArmored), objected that such an operationwould warn the enemy of the planned Mak-nassy attack, the foray went ahead.The raiding force started out from Gafsaat 4 a.m. on January 24. Company C of the81st Reconnaissance Battalion took up posi-tion east of the station to stop any enemyreinforcements coming from Maknassy andartillery opened up about 11.15 a.m. from aposition to the west. One company ofarmoured infantry then advanced from thewest, with tanks and more infantry coming infrom the south. The small hamlet of a fewhouses and olive trees was soon taken and by3 p.m. Combat Command C was assemblingfor the return march. Three hours later theforce was back in bivouac near Gafsa. Losseswere quite small, and prisoners totalled 96,with enemy killed and wounded at Senedestimated to be about the same number.II Corps then finalised its plans for theattack on Maknassy, scheduled for February1. Combat Command C was to advancenorth-eastwards to turn on Maknassy fromthe north via the Maïzila Pass while a tempo-rary Combat Command D under Colonel5
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]