144 The Battle of El Guettar, After the Battle, After the Battle(1)
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//-->THE BATTLE OF EL GUETTARNONumber 1444 49770306154097WINCOLO£4.25URNUMBER 144© CopyrightAfter the Battle2009Editor-in-Chief: Winston G. RamseyManaging Editor: Gordon RamseyEditor: Karel MargryPublished byBattle of Britain International Ltd.,The Mews, Hobbs Cross House,Hobbs Cross, Old Harlow,Essex CM17 0NN, EnglandTelephone: 01279 41 8833Fax: 01279 41 9386E-mail: hq@afterthebattle.comWebsite: www.afterthebattle.comPrinted in Great Britain byWarners Group Publications PLC.,Bourne, Lincolnshire PE10 9PH.After the Battleis published on the 15thof February, May, August and November.LONDON STOCKIST for theAfter the Battlerange:Motorbooks, 13/15 Cecil Court, London WC2N 4ANTelephone: 020 7836 5376. Fax: 020 7497 2539United Kingdom Newsagent Distribution:Warners Group Publications PLC.,Bourne, Lincolnshire PE10 9PHAustralian Subscriptions and Back Issues:Renniks Publications Pty LimitedUnit 3, 37-39 Green Street, Banksmeadow NSW 2019Telephone: 61 2 9695 7055. Fax: 61 2 9695 7355E-mail: info@renniks.com. Web site: www.renniks.comCanadian Distribution and Subscriptions:Vanwell Publishing Ltd., PO Box 2131,1 Northrup Crescent, St. Catharines, Ontario L2R 7S2.Telephone: (905) 937 3100 Fax: (905) 937 1760Toll Free: 1-800-661-6136E-mail: sales@vanwell.comNew Zealand Distribution:Dal McGuirk’s “MILITARY ARCHIVE”, P.O. Box 24486,Royal Oak, Auckland 1030 New Zealand.Telephone: 021 627 870 Fax: 9-6252817E-mail: milrchiv@mist.co.nzUnited States Distribution and Subscriptions:RZM Imports Inc, 880 Canal St., Stamford, CT 06902Telephone: 1-203-324-5100 Fax: 1-203-324-5106E-mail: info@rzm.com Website: www.rzm.comItalian Distribution:Tuttostoria, PO Box 395, 1-43100 Parma.Telephone: ++390521 29 27 33, Fax: ++390521 29 03 87E-mail: info@tuttostoria.it Web site: www.tuttostoria.itDutch Language Edition:SI Publicaties/Quo Vadis, Postbus 188,6860 AD Oosterbeek.Telephone: 026-4462834 E-mail: si@sipublicaties.nlOn November 8, 1942, Allied forces assaulted western North Africa, landings takingplace simultaneously at Casablanca, Oran and Algiers. Three days later, the assaultforces were secure and the Eastern Task Force pressed eastwards, on to Tunisia. An air-borne operation was launched on November 15 near Tébessa, Algeria, and another onthe 16th at Souk el Arba, Tunisia, and a first clash with Axis forces in Tunisia occurredat Djebel Abiod on the 17th.Above:This M3 Grant medium tank was pictured in abivouac area of the US 1st Armored Division near Souk El Arba on November 21.After the disastrous and humiliatingdefeat suffered by the US II Corps in the bat-tle of Kasserine in southern Tunisia in Feb-ruary 1943 (seeAfter the BattleNo. 134), theCommander-in-Chief Allied ExpeditionaryForce in North Africa, General Dwight D.Eisenhower, felt compelled to relieve thecorps commander, Major General Lloyd R.Fredendall. Having spread his forces too thinand committed his reserves piecemeal, Fre-dendall had directed the operations poorly,lost control of his corps and also forfeited theconfidence of his troops. Looking for areplacement, Eisenhower chose Major Gen-eral George S. Patton, who was then inMorocco, commanding US I Armored Corpsand busy designing plans for Operation‘Husky’, the Allied invasion of Sicily, sched-uled for later that year.On March 4, Major General Walter BedellSmith, Eisenhower’s Chief-of-Staff, tele-phoned Patton’s headquarters at Rabat. Pat-ton was out horse-riding, so Smith left anurgent message to the effect that Patton wasto leave the following day ‘for extended fieldduty’. He was to report by air to Algiers tak-ing along an acting chief-of-staff and two ormore staff officers.CONTENTSTHE BATTLE OF EL GUETTARFROM THE EDITORAUSTRALIAPOW Camp No. 13 at MurchisonPERSONALITYPutting a Name to a Face2223050Front Cover:The vast, arid expanse ofsouthern Tunisia, with Djebel Meloussi, asseen from Sened Station. (Jean Paul Pallud)Inset:An M3 light tank of the 13th ArmoredRegiment near El Guettar, February 1943.Centre Pages:During a running battle inNovember 1941, a German armed merchant-man sank the Australian cruiser HMASSydney.After they were captured, thecrewmen of theKormoranerected thismemorial to their fallen comrades which stillstands at the site of their POW camp atMurchison, Australia. (David Green)Back Cover:Leslie Sutton, standard bearer forthe Association of Jewish Ex-Servicemen andWomen in a moment of remembrance at thededication of the plaque at Saundersness RoadSchool, Poplar, in December 2008. (Gail Parker)Acknowledgements:For his help with the ElGuettar story, the Editor would like to thankTatar Adlene, director of the Hotel Caracalla atTébessa (seehotelcaracalla@yahoo.fr).Forassistance with the Camp No. 13 story heextends his appreciation to Arthur and LurlineKnee of the Tatura & District Historical Societyand to Jeff Thomas, Operations manager atthe Dhurringile Prison, and for help with theGeorge Shomo story, he thanks Norman S.Lichtenfeld and Benjamin J. Lucarelli.Photo Credits:AWM — Australian WarMemorial, Canberra; BA — Bundesarchiv;ECPAD — Médiathèque de la Défense, Fortd’Ivry; IWM — Imperial War Museum, London;USNA — US National ArchivesIn mid-February 1943, the Axis forces launched a strong counter-attack against theUS II Corps in south-western Tunisia. The 1st Armored Division’s counter-movesended in complete disaster, the division losing two of its tank battalions in two days,with over 2,500 American soldiers being taken prisoner on February 16 and 17.Above:This group of POWs has halted for a rest near the village of Faïd during theirlong march eastwards. In the background lies Djebel Bou Dzer with the Faïd Pass onthe left (seeAfter the BattleNo. 134).2ECPAD DAK282 L22USNATHE BATTLE OF EL GUETTAROn March 5, Patton flew to Algiers, leavinghis Deputy, Major General Geoffrey Keyes,and his Chief-of-Staff, Colonel Hobart R.Gay, behind to continue the planning forSicily and taking with him his planned newChief-of-Staff, Brigadier General Hugh J.Gaffey; his Intelligence Officer, ColonelOskar W. Koch; his Operations Officer,Colonel Kent C. Lambert; his aides, CaptainRichard N. Jenson and Lieutenant AlexanderL. Stiller; and his black orderly, Sergeant W.George Meeks. Eisenhower, who had himselfflown in from Tébessa, met them on the air-field and gave Patton his instructions. He wasto take command of II Corps and get it backon its feet with all possible speed. He was torestore American prestige, give the soldiersback their self-respect and prove their abilityto defeat the Germans. He was to have noqualms about removing inefficient comman-ders. He was to institute intensive training,re-equipping, re-organisation, application ofall lessons learnt thus far, and careful plan-ning of the logistics of attack. Also, his corpswould be fighting under British commandand he should instil in his men a spirit of gen-uine partnership with the British.Patton flew on to Constantine to conferwith his new superior, British Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Alexander, the comman-der of the 18th Army Group. Formed on Feb-ruary 19, Alexander’s headquarterscontrolled the three Allied formations thatwere fighting in North Africa: British EighthArmy, under Lieutenant-General BernardMontgomery, which had driven the GermanAfrikakorps westwards out of Libya and intoTunisia and was now approaching the Ger-man stop position at the Mareth Line; BritishFirst Army under Lieutenant-General Ken-neth Anderson, which was in northernTunisia, making slow progress eastwardstowards Tunis; and the US II Corps,deployed in southern Tunisia licking itswounds after the Kasserine setback. Thecorps had fought that battle as part of Ander-son’s First Army but would now be put underdirect control of 18th Army Group.By Jean Paul PalludOn the morning of March 6, ‘erect like a charioteer’ in the lead car of a siren-blaringcavalcade of armoured vehicles, Major General George S. Patton arrived at DjebelKouif, a small mining town 25 kilometres north of Tébessa, to take over command ofII Corps. Then on the 16th, General Eisenhower came to the II Corps headquarters for aconference during which he confirmed Patton’s recent promotion to lieutenant generalby pinning three stars on him.3USNAUSNAUSNAJean Paul was unable to trace the location of the award cere-mony from the records, and the date when these photos weretaken — March 16 — added confusion as this was the day whenPatton left Djebel Kouif to establish his new HQ at Fériana.Top:This photo is usually printed to merely show Patton and Eisen-hower but Jean Paul’s attention was drawn to a faint imagewhich could be seen through the window.Left:He decided toorder an overexposed print centred on the window, with a hope-lessly dark forefront, but with the outside view now clearlyvisible. He then used this print as a clue to search for the locationand finally succeeded, thanks to the help of Tatar Adlene, thedirector of the Hotel Caracalla at Tébessa.Above:As proven bythis old postcard of 1921, the building seen outside was thediesel power station of the phosphate mine at Djebel Kouif.Unfortunately, Tatar Adlene could not gain access to the roomwhere the photos had been taken in 1943 so instead he took4these shots of the derelict power station which has been aban-doned since the mine closed decades ago.TATAR ADLENETATAR ADLENEUSNAThree days previously, on March 2, FirstArmy had already issued a directive to IICorps which clearly detailed its subsidiaryrole: the corps was to stage demonstratingattacks to draw off enemy reserves fromEighth Army; to gain control of forward air-fields from which to furnish assistance toEighth Army; and to establish a maintenancecentre at Gafsa from which Eighth Armycould draw supplies once it had broken intothe Gabès plain. The corps’ first mission wasto recover Gafsa from the Italian garrison byan attack to start not later than March 15.Troops not required for the defence of Gafsacould then demonstrate toward Maknassy asa menace to the Axis’ lines of communica-tions along the coast.Following the Kasserine débâcle, whichhad revealed the deficiencies of Americanunits, Alexander was left with a poor opinionof US troops and lacked confidence in thecapacity of II Corps to execute a full-scaleoperation under its own responsibility. Whilehe appreciated Patton as a colourful leaderwho might restore II Corps’ confidenceovernight, he also realised that Patton mighteasily be tempted to undertake some rashoffensive move before his men were readyfor another clash with Axis troops. There-fore, he made sure to carefully proscribe toTUNISKAIROUANDJEBEL KOUIFFONDOUKKASSERINEFERIANAMAKNASSYSENED STATIONGAFSAEL GUETTARGABESPatton the limitations of his task. He was toadvance from the Western to the EasternDorsale; seize the town of Gafsa; and takethe key passes leading through the EasternDorsale, at El Guettar (east of Gafsa) andMaknassy (north-east of Gafsa). However,he was merely to threaten the Axis flank, notto proceed beyond the Eastern Dorsale intothe Gabès coastal plain.Thus, Patton was kept on a very tight rein.He was given detailed instructions for a verycontrolled offensive, which was to be built upby stages, each stage being increased in scopeas the training, combat experience andmorale of the Americans improved. A fewvictories, it was hoped, even though minor,would bring the performance of Americanunits up to the required level. To make surethat Patton would not enter into some over-ambitious offensive action, Alexanderdirected that all II Corps movements weresubject at all times to 18th Army Group’sapproval. As Patton later complained in aletter to US Army Chief-of-Staff GeneralGeorge C. Marshall, Alexander specified thescope of each operation: ‘All I have is theactual conduct of the operations prescribed.’Patton did not like Alexander’s limitations atall but — good soldier that he was — hegrudgingly obeyed.On the morning of March 6, Patton arrivedat the II Corps command post in the school-house at Djebel Kouif near Tébessa and for-mally relieved Fredendall, handing him ahand-written letter from Eisenhower whichmade the change in command official andfinal. Fredendall left immediately after-wards. (He would return to the States, bepromoted to lieutenant general and takecommand of an army in training.) Present atthe corps headquarters was Major GeneralOmar N. Bradley, who had been sent thereby Eisenhower as his ‘eyes and ears’ duringthe height of the Kasserine crisis. Patton wasuncomfortable with Bradley’s status and,5HMSO
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