147 The Battle For Cherbourg, After the Battle, After the Battle(1)
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//-->4 79770306154097£4.25THE BATTLE FOR CHERBOURGNumber 147NUMBER 147© CopyrightAfter the Battle2010Editor: Karel MargryEditor-in-Chief: Winston G. RamseyPublished byBattle of Britain International Ltd.,The Mews, Hobbs Cross House,Hobbs Cross, Old Harlow,Essex CM17 0NN, EnglandTelephone: 01279 41 8833Fax: 01279 41 9386E-mail: hq@afterthebattle.comWebsite:www.afterthebattle.comPrinted in Great Britain byWarners Group Publications PLC,Bourne, Lincolnshire PE10 9PH.After the Battleis published on the 15thof February, May, August and November.LONDON STOCKIST for theAfter the Battlerange:Motorbooks, 13/15 Cecil Court, London WC2N 4ANTelephone: 020 7836 5376. Fax: 020 7497 2539United Kingdom Newsagent Distribution:Warners Group Publications PLC,Bourne, Lincolnshire PE10 9PHAustralian Subscriptions and Back Issues:Renniks Publications Pty LimitedUnit 3, 37-39 Green Street, Banksmeadow NSW 2019Telephone: 61 2 9695 7055. Fax: 61 2 9695 7355E-mail: info@renniks.com. 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E-mail: si@sipublicaties.nlUTAH BEACHCONTENTSTHE BATTLE FOR CHERBOURGWRECK DISCOVERYThe Japanese Tanks of BougainvilleUNITED KINGDOMThe Women’s Land ArmyIT HAPPENED HEREThe Case of Pilot OfficerJohn Benzie2303750Early on June 18, troops of US VII Corps, having advanced from Utah Beach sinceD-Day, reached Barneville and Carteret on the west coast of the Cotentin, cutting thepeninsula in half. For the next ten days the Americans concentrated their operationson a northward drive aimed at taking Cherbourg and its port. The VII Corps attackedwith three divisions abreast on June 19, encountering no opposition except on itsright wing where the 4th Division came up against organised resistance in theMontebourg sector. Attacking with tank support on either side of the town, the 8thand 12th Infantry Regiments finally broke the German defence and by nightfall the8th Infantry was south and east of Valognes with the 12th Infantry on its right.When plans were drawn up for the Alliedinvasion of France, one important considera-tion was that it would be necessary to securea deep-water port to allow reinforcements tobe brought in directly from the UnitedStates. Cherbourg, at the tip of the Cotentinpeninsula in Normandy, was closest to thelanding beaches and the planners conse-quently decided that the US First Army’smain task should be ‘to capture Cherbourgas quickly as possible’.The US 82nd and 101st Airborne Divi-sions spearheaded Operation ‘Overlord’ inthe west, landing at the base of the peninsula.Their landings were scattered but they nev-ertheless secured most of the routes by whichthe American forces landing at Utah Beachwould advance. The US 4th Infantry Divi-sion landed on Utah Beach shortly afterdawn with few casualties (seeD-Day Thenand Now).For the first days, the priority wasto link up with the main Allied landings fur-ther east. The flooded Douve valley wascrossed on June 9 and Carentan captured thenext day, giving the Allies a continuous frontat which point US VII Corps began to drivewestwards to cut off the peninsula at its base.On June 9, concerned over the threat of anenemy breakthrough to Cherbourg, the Ger-man 7. Armee ordered the 77. Infanterie-Division, then coming up from Brittany, toproceed up the peninsula to Valognes. Twodays later, Generalfeldmarschall Gerd vonRundstedt, the German Commander-in-Chief in the West, and GeneralfeldmarschallErwin Rommel, the commander of Heeres-gruppe B, met to discuss the serious situationand agreed to report independently to Hitler.Both reports gave the same appreciation ofthe German situation in Normandy and ofthe Allies’ intentions. Von Rundstedtexplained that ‘the formations of Heeres-gruppe B fighting in Normandy are forced onto the defensive between the Orne and theVire. Offensive operations cannot as yet beconducted in this broad sector for lack offorces and because the panzer divisions hadto be used for defence.’ In order to prevent abreakthrough to Cherbourg, which was obvi-ously the immediate American objective,Front Cover:Captain William H. Hooper of the 314thInfantry Regiment, 79th Division, leading a group ofGerman POWs out of Cherbourg along Avenue deParis on June 28, 1944. Hooper would be killed twoweeks later near La Haye-du-Puits. (USNA)Inset:The same view today. This is the old toll entrance tothe city, known as L’Octroi, with Rue Armand Levéelbranching off to the right in the background (seepage 13). (Jean Paul Pallud)Centre Pages:The remains of German coastal Battery‘Blankenese’ in the dunes near Néville, 25 kilometreseast of Cherbourg. Comprising four casemates for94mm Flak guns and a fire-control bunker, it wasmanned in June 1944 by the 2. Batterie of Marine-Artillerie-Abteilung 260. (Jean Paul Pallud)Back Cover:We believe that this headstone to anunknown pilot of the Second World War inBrookwood Cemetery, Surrey, marks the last restingplace of Pilot Officer John Benzie. (ATB)Acknowledgements:Our story on the battle forCherbourg is taken fromCross-Channel Attack(Washington, 1951) by Gordon A. Harrison, avolume of the official history of the US Army inWorld War II, adapted and expanded with detailsfrom German sources. The Editor would like tothank the French Marine Nationale, particularly ViceAmiral Philippe Périssé, Préfet Maritime atCherbourg, and the Direction des ConstructionsNavales (DCNS), particularly M. Bruno Richebé,Director Cherbourg, for allowing Jean Paul Pallud tovisit their installations. He also thanks MarieThérèse, Catherine, Jacques and Yannick Berton;Comte and Comtesse Arnaud de Pontac; RogerDelarocque and La Cité de la Mer. The Editor isfurther indebted to Roy J. Turner for his generoushelp with the feature on the Women’s Land Army.Photo Credits:AWM — Australian War Memorial,Canberra; BA — Bundesarchiv; USNA — US NationalArchives.2Above:In the second half of June 1944, the US First Armydirected all its efforts towards the capture of Cherbourg as thegreat Channel port was considered vital for the supply of theAmerican forces. Signal Corps photographer Sergeant PeterJ. Petrony pictured an M8 armoured car of the 801st TankDestroyer Battalion entering Montebourg during the north-ward advance toward the port city.Below:The southernentrance to Montebourg remains unchanged.THE BATTLE FOR CHERBOURGthey proposed to counter-attack in theCotentin. Pointing out that the purpose ofthis strike would be ‘to annihilate the enemythere’, Rommel stressed that ‘only when thishas been accomplished can the enemybetween the Orne and the Vire be attacked’.Refusing the field-marshals’ demand thata counter-attack in the Cotentin was anurgent need, Hitler’s reaction on June 12 wasto insist that ‘the enemy bridgehead betweenthe Orne and Vire must be attacked anddestroyed piece by piece’.By Jean Paul PalludBy June 14, it was clear that the Americanswere close to cutting the peninsula in half soRommel decided that two divisions (the 243.3ATBUSNAUSNAAbove:The original plan for the drive on Cherbourg was for a two-division attack, bythe 4th and 90th Divisions, while the 9th Division took up a blocking position on thewest coast. However, on June 18, after consultation with Lieutenant General OmarBradley, the First Army commander (left), and some of his division commanders,Major General J. Lawton Collins, the VII Corps commander (right), changed his plansin favour of a stronger attack. In order to take maximum advantage of the Germandisintegration, the idea was now to commit the corps’ full combat strength. A freshdivision, the 79th, would be deployed and three divisions — the 9th, 79th and 4th —would drive northwards abreast while the 90th Division would take over the task ofblocking along the west coast. Here General Bradley listens to Collins (wearing gog-gles and an M1911 pistol in a shoulder holster) describing how the Cherbourg battlewas fought — a picture taken later in June or early July.and 709. Infanterie-Divisions) would be suf-ficient for the defence of Cherbourg and thatthe 77. Infanterie-Division should be movedsouth to oppose the American push to thesouth. Accordingly the 7. Armee issuedorders to divide the forces in the Cotentininto two groups. Gruppe von Schlieben(under Generalleutnant Karl-Wilhelm vonSchlieben, the commander of the 709. Infan-terie-Division), consisting of his own divisionand all the troops deployed on the Monte-bourg line (save the 77. Infanterie-Division),was charged with the defence of Cherbourg.Meanwhile, Gruppe Hellmich (underGeneralleutnant Hans Hellmich, the com-mander of the 243. Infanterie-Division), withthe 77. Infanterie-Division and all thosetroops south and west of the Merderet river,received the task of building a defensive linenear the base of the Cotentin, between themarshlands west of Carentan and the penin-sula’s west coast near Portbail.However, the following day an order fromHitler arrived which stipulated that the pre-sent line must be ‘held at all cost’. Rommel,who was at the LXXXIV. Armeekorps head-quarters near Saint-Lô when the Führerdecree reached him, tried to make the best ofan impossible situation. He decided that the77. Infanterie-Division should send some ele-ments southwards while ostensibly holdingits ground. However, the 7. Armee soon for-bade any move and orders given to the 77.Infanterie-Division were countermanded. Asa consequence, nothing was accomplishedduring the night of June 16/17, squanderingthe last chance of rescuing the 77. Infanterie-Division from the closing trap.4Following a demand from von Rundstedton June 15 that someone from the Oberkom-mando der Wehrmacht (OKW, GermanArmed Forces High Command) must cometo France to discuss the situation, Hitlerdecided to come personally. A conferencewas arranged at the ‘Wolfsschlucht 2’ com-plex of camouflaged bunkers at Margival,north-east of Soissons (seeAfter the BattleNo. 19), on the morning of the 17th. Findingfault with the local commanders, Hitlerexpressed his dissatisfaction with theirattempts to counter the Allied landings. VonRundstedt and Rommel sought to obtainfreedom of action, including permission todraw at will on reserves from coastal areasnot immediately threatened by invasion.They also recommended certain withdrawalsin order to shorten their lines and concen-trate their forces but Hitler refused all ofthis. Instead, he ordered that fortress Cher-bourg must be held at any cost as long as pos-sible.On June 17, the VII Corps continued itsadvance westwards, the main effort beingmade by the US 9th Division. Early on June18, troops of its 60th Infantry enteredBarneville, cutting the coast road and thuspractically sealing off the base of theCotentin. During the night and the followingmorning columns of Gruppe Hellmich triedto force their way southwards. On the 19th,elements of Grenadier-Regiment 1050 (ofthe 77. Infanterie-Division) succeeded in tak-ing a bridge over the Ollande river, capturingmore than 100 Americans, and permittingsome 1,400 men to slip through to the south.This was one of the few German successes.Many other columns were caught on theroad and destroyed, among them the remain-der of the divisional artillery. Delay in mak-ing vital decisions resulted in a disastrousconfusion that sacrificed the bulk of the 77.Infanterie-Division for no gain. Amongthose who failed to escape were Generalleut-nant Hellmich, killed on June 17, and Gen-eralmajor Rudolf Stegmann, the commanderof the 77. Infanterie-Division, fatallywounded near Bricquebec during a fighter-bomber attack the following afternoon.Originally, VII Corps planned a two-divi-sion drive on Cherbourg with the 90th Divi-sion on the right and the 4th Division on theleft. However, the 90th had demonstratedtoo many signs of unreadiness in the recentfighting, and on June 13 its commander,Brigadier General Jay W. MacKelvie wasrelieved and replaced by Major GeneralEugene M. Landrum. (Two regimental com-manders, Colonel Philip H. Ginder of the357th Infantry and Colonel James W.Thompson of the 358th Infantry, wererelieved at the same time.) As a fresh divi-sion — the 79th Infantry Division — wasavailable, the VII Corps commander, MajorGeneral J. Lawton Collins, asked for andreceived it as a replacement for the 90th.On June 18, a new, stronger plan of attackwas developed by General Collins in consul-tation with Lieutenant General Omar N.Bradley, the commander of the US FirstArmy, and some of the division comman-ders. The drive on Cherbourg would now becarried out by three divisions abreast: the 4thon the right, the 79th in the centre and the9th on the left. The 4th Division was tobypass the coastal defences in order toadvance as rapidly as possible with its rightflank protected by the 24th CavalrySquadron. The 4th Cavalry Squadron was tobe used to attack between the 9th and 79thDivisions while the 90th Division was to takeover the role initially envisioned for the 9thDivision of blocking the west coast.Through capture by the 9th Division offield orders of the LXXXIV. Armeekorpsand the 77. Infanterie-Division, VII Corpshad a pretty accurate picture of the state ofGerman defences in the peninsula. GeneralCollins knew of the splitting of Germanforces and of the order to General vonSchlieben to withdraw on the fortress Cher-bourg. The last-minute attempt of the 77.Infanterie-Division to pull south of the 9thDivision lines had been cut off, and it couldbe assumed that disorganisation existed inthe western half of the German lines. Byattacking fast and hard VII Corps mightexploit the disorganisation as well as pushGeneral von Schlieben’s planned withdrawalinto a rout. VII Corps Intelligence estimatedthat the enemy would fight delaying actionsand would stand for a defence of Cherbourgon the line of hills ringing it to a depth ofabout five miles. Fixed defences in this posi-tion had been reconnoitred and plotted accu-rately long before D-Day. Although theexact number of German troops at vonSchlieben’s disposal for the defence of Cher-bourg could only be guessed at, it was knownthat all his major combat units (the 709., 243.,91. and 77. Infanterie-Divisions) existed onlyin fragments. The total enemy force lockedin the peninsula was variously estimated atbetween 25,000 and 40,000 including Flakand naval personnel and Organisation Todtworkers.The VII Corps attacked early on June 19.On the left, the 9th Division (Major GeneralManton S. Eddy) encountered no oppositionand easily reached its designated objectives.In the centre, the 79th Division (Major Gen-eral Ira T. Wyche) did the same on its leftwing although it experienced some difficul-ties on its right south-west of Valognes. Onlythe 4th Division (Major General RaymondO. Barton) on the right wing came up againstorganised resistance when the 8th and 12thInfantry Regiments attacked side by side ona north-west axis on either side of Monte-bourg. However, tank support got the attackmoving and both regiments soon broke theGerman line. By nightfall the 8th Infantrywas just south and east of Valognes with the12th Infantry on its right. The 22nd Infantryentered Montebourg at 6 p.m. and found thetown deserted.The resistance in front of the 4th Divisionon June 19 was actually little more than agesture by General von Schlieben at carryingout his orders to fight his way slowly back tofortress Cherbourg. The orders couldscarcely have been carried out. On his westflank, von Schlieben had no positions to holdand only disorganised troops who wouldhave been needlessly sacrificed if they hadattempted a stand. The plunge forward of the9th and 79th Divisions during June 19 ren-dered defence of the sector opposite the 4thDivision useless and dangerous. During thenight, therefore, von Schlieben ordered ageneral disengagement on this front anddrew all his force back to the fortress ringimmediately defending Cherbourg.5
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